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“The manufacture of doubt” refers to a speaker’s 
strategic efforts to undermine factual assertions that threaten its 
self-interest. This strategy was perhaps most famously 
employed by the tobacco industry in its longstanding campaign 
to contest the mounting medical evidence that linked cigarettes 
to serious health conditions.1 At its best, the government’s 
speech can counter such efforts and protect the public interest, 
as exemplified by the Surgeon General’s groundbreaking 1964 
report on the dangers of tobacco, a report that challenged the 
industry’s preferred narrative.2 But the government’s speech is 
not always so heroic, and governments themselves sometimes 
seek to manufacture doubt and protect their own interest at the 
expense of the public’s.3  
In this short Essay, I examine how the government as 
speaker sometimes seeks to manufacture doubt about factual 
assertions it perceives as inconsistent with its policy or partisan 
preferences. I start with some background on the history of 
government speech in the United States, a history that reveals 
the diversity and complexity of the government’s expressive 
choices. Drawing from historical and contemporary examples, I 
then identify at least three strategies through which the 
government sometimes seeks to manufacture doubt: through its 
lies and misrepresentations, through its attacks on individuals 
and institutions that challenge its preferred narrative, and 
                                                             
* Professor and Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr. Chair in Constitutional Law, University of 
Colorado School of Law. Thanks to Hannah Armentrout and Katherine Struthers 
for excellent research assistance, and to the participants at the “Distorting the Truth: 
‘Fake News’ and Free Speech” symposium at the University of North Carolina 
School of Law for thoughtful comments. 
1 See NAOMI ORESKES AND ERIK M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A 
HANDFUL OF SCIENTISTS OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM TOBACCO SMOKE 
TO GLOBAL WARMING 33–34 (2010) (“[T]he tobacco industry knew the dangers of 
smoking as early as 1953 and conspired to suppress the knowledge. They conspired 
to fight the facts, and to merchandise doubt. . . . The industry defended its primary 
product—tobacco—by manufacturing something else: doubt about its harm.”).  
2 See generally, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, No. 1103, SMOKING 
AND HEALTH: REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GEN. OF THE 
PUBLIC HEALTH SERV. (1964) (describing the adverse health effects of smoking). 
3 These strategies are neither new nor unique to American governments. See Amanda 
Taub, ‘Kompromat’ and the Danger of Doubts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2017, at A3 
(“[K]ompromat is more than an individual piece of damaging information: It is a 
broader attempt to manufacture public cynicism and confusion in ways that target 
not just one individual but an entire society. . . . By eroding the very idea of a shared 
reality, and by spreading apathy and confusion among a public that learns to distrust 
leaders and institutions alike, kompromat undermines a society’s ability to hold the 
powerful to account and ensure the proper functioning of government.”). 




through its choices to bury or deny access to information that it 
finds inconvenient or dangerous. I close by briefly considering 
possible responses to these strategies.  
 
I. SOME BACKGROUND ON THE GOVERNMENT’S EXPRESSIVE 
CHOICES 
 
In this Part, I very briefly sketch the variety and 
complexity—as well as the pervasiveness—of the government’s 
expressive choices. For example, when we discuss government 
speech, we often focus on presidential expression. But 
legislative and judicial branch speakers—as well as speakers 
from all levels of federal, state, and local governments —also 
deserve our attention and, at times, our concern. The 
government’s audiences are similarly diverse: they include not 
only the American public but also our foreign allies, neutrals, 
and enemies. They include other government speakers as well; 
indeed, separation of powers and federalism principles in great 
part seek to force different government actors to talk with each 
other.4 The full range of the government’s expressive choices is 
also broad, and includes not only its affirmative speech—such 
as the substance, tone, and delivery of its debates, dialogue, and 
counterspeech—but also its silences.5  
Over time, governmental speakers have made very 
different decisions about how to deploy these expressive 
possibilities. With respect to presidential speech, for example, 
historian Jeffrey Tulis explains that “[t]he rhetorical presidency 
                                                             
4 See MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND 
GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 91 (1983) (“In Madisonian fashion, 
powerful communicators should be played off against one another, preventing any 
one group or elite from gaining ideological dominance. Governments should be 
pitted against one another in the wars of words and symbols, and government 
communications generally should be subject to the counterforce of communications 
emanating from a healthy, diverse, and pluralistic private sector.”). 
5 Here I distinguish the government’s “silences” from its “secrets.” Governmental 
secrets generally involve the government’s decision not to disclose certain facts. See 
infra notes 81–85 and accompanying text. By governmental silences, in contrast, I 
mean the government’s failure to speak on a contested public policy issue or crisis. 
For examples of such governmental silences, see NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF 
MASSIVE RESISTANCE 63 (1969) (“Eisenhower was later to state in his memoirs that 
the Supreme Court’s judgment in the desegregation cases was unquestionably 
correct. During his years in office, however, the President failed to express publically 
his approval either of the principle enunciated in the Brown decision or of the ruling 
itself. Since the racial question was the dominant domestic issue of the period, he 
made many comments on the subject. Yet not once did he endorse the desegregation 
decision or offer support to those struggling to implement its provisions. ‘I do not 
believe,’ the President reiterated, ‘it is the function or indeed it is desirable for a 
President to express his approval or disapproval of any Supreme Court decision.’”); 
GEOFFREY R. STONE, SEX AND THE CONSTITUTION: SEX, RELIGION, AND LAW FROM 
AMERICA’S ORIGINS TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 259 (2017) (describing 
President Reagan’s reluctance to engage AIDS as a public health crisis). 
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and the understanding of American politics that it signifies are 
twentieth-century inventions and discoveries. Our pre-
twentieth-century polity proscribed the rhetorical presidency as 
ardently as we prescribe it.”6 Indeed, the Framers feared that 
charismatic speakers posed grave threats to a democratic state,7 
and thus sought to limit such speakers’ power and influence 
through norms of discourse along with structural constraints.8 
Starting with George Washington and continuing through most 
of the 19th century, for example, presidents expressed 
themselves primarily through written communications that 
offered greater formality and opportunity for reflection; along 
these lines, Jefferson began a tradition of sending his 
assessment of the State of the Union to Congress in writing, 
rather than through an oral address he felt more appropriate for 
a monarch.9 Similarly, Andrew Jackson “made his arguments 
to the people in the form of official statements such as his 
annual messages and the Nullification Proclamation, rather 
than by giving speeches. This formalized process allowed 
presidential positions on the Constitution to be fully vetted with 
advisors and crafted for widespread consumption.”10  
Abraham Lincoln serves as the exemplar of thoughtful 
and restrained presidential rhetoric, largely preferring “to 
address the people through the press without the intervention of 
editors . . . .”11 Lincoln’s successor, Andrew Johnson, provides 
the exception that demonstrates the rule, as Johnson routinely 
engaged in direct and informal appeals to the public that struck 
                                                             
6 JEFFREY K. TULIS, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY 5–7 (1987). 
7 See James W. Ceaser, Demagoguery, Statesmanship, and Presidential Politics, in THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRESIDENCY 251 (Joseph M. Bessette & Jeffrey K. Tullis eds., 
2009) (“The Federalist is filled with grave warnings against flattery and against the 
‘artful misrepresentations of interested men’ who encourage the people to indulge 
‘the tyranny of their own passions.’”); TULIS, supra note 6, at 27 (“The founders 
worried especially about the danger that a powerful executive might pose to the 
system if power were derived from the role of popular leader. For most federalists, 
‘demagogue’ and ‘popular leader’ were synonyms, and nearly all references to 
popular leaders in their writings are pejorative.”).  
8 See Ceaser, supra note 7, at 252 (explaining that the Framers sought to channel 
presidential communication “away from informal popular orations and towards 
more deliberative forms of rhetoric”). 
9 See TULIS, supra note 6, at 56. 
10 HAROLD H. BRUFF, UNTRODDEN GROUND: HOW PRESIDENTS INTERPRET THE 
CONSTITUTION 105 (2015). 
11 HAROLD HOLZER, LINCOLN AND THE POWER OF THE PRESS: THE WAR FOR PUBLIC 
OPINION 518 (2014); see also TULIS, supra note 6, at 80 (“Some have suggested that 
the rhetorical presidency might be a reflection of increased opportunity for popular 
leadership (development of wire services, mass communications, etc.), rather than a 
doctrinal change. Lincoln makes clear not only that he did not lack opportunity, but 
that such opportunities were the problem. Hastily formed statements might engender 
a course of policy that was unintended. Finally, Lincoln indicates that ‘silence’ will 
enhance the persuasive power of those speeches that he does deliver.”).  




his contemporary observers as inappropriate.12 Indeed, the 
House of Representatives’ (ultimately unsuccessful) articles of 
impeachment show how deeply Johnson’s expressive choices 
offended prevailing norms of presidential discourse, in that he 
was alleged to have made:  
 
with a loud voice certain intemperate, 
inflammatory and scandalous harangues, and did 
therein utter loud threats and bitter menaces as 
well against Congress as the laws of the United 
States . . . . Which said utterances, declarations, 
threats, and harangues, highly censurable in any, 
are peculiarly indecent and unbecoming in the 
Chief Magistrate of the United States, by means 
whereof Andrew Johnson has brought the high 
office of the President of the United States into 
contempt, ridicule, and disgrace, to the great 
scandal of all good citizens. . . . 13  
 
Presidents’ expressive choices changed dramatically in 
the 20th century. Teddy Roosevelt started this shift with his 
strategic decision to advocate for his policies directly to the 
people rather than to Congress.14 Woodrow Wilson built on 
this move by resuscitating the long-dormant presidential 
tradition of delivering a State of the Union address to Congress 
in person and by offering important policy statements directly 
to the citizenry through public speeches.15 Newer 
communicative technologies further enabled and emboldened 
this turn, as Franklin D. Roosevelt “became the first master of 
the electronic media” with fireside chats broadcast directly to 
the public,16 and “Kennedy began the practice of live televised 
press conferences [because he] wanted to control the news.”17 
Professor Tulis summarizes this revolution in the norms of 
presidential discourse: “Today it is taken for granted that 
                                                             
12 See TULIS, supra note 6, at 89 (“Nothing could be further from the founders’ 
intentions than for presidential power to depend upon the interplay of orator and 
crowd. This interplay may or may not persuade the immediate audience, but the 
effect of such activity upon the president’s office, upon his dignity, upon his future 
ability to persuade, and upon the deliberative process as a whole is likely to be 
deleterious.”). 
13Articles of Impeachment of Andrew Johnson, TEACHINGAMERICANHISTORY.ORG, 
teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/articles-of-impeachment-of-andrew-
johnson (last visited Mar. 11, 2018).  
14 TULIS, supra note 6, at 4 (“The core of [Roosevelt’s] argument was that a change in 
authorized practices was necessary to fulfill the purposes of the underlying founding 
theory of governance.”). 
15 Id. at 133. 
16 See BRUFF, supra note 10, at 231. 
17 Id. at 294. 
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presidents have a duty constantly to defend themselves publicly, 
to promote policy initiatives nationwide, and to inspirit the 
population. And for many, this presidential ‘function’ is not 
one duty among many, but rather the heart of the presidency—
its essential task.”18 
         More recently, President Trump’s expressive choices 
provide novel departures from traditional norms in their 
substance, tone, and means of delivery. Trump himself 
celebrates his expressive innovations, innovations that some 
find resonant and others repellent: “Trump argued over the 
weekend that his outsized Twitter presence was part of a 
calculated redefinition of the presidency: ‘My use of social 
media is not Presidential—it’s MODERN DAY 
PRESIDENTIAL.’”19 As just one example, Trump is unusually 
combative and eager to engage conflict, rather than defuse it, 
with his speech—a choice that some attribute to his background 
in entertainment, media, and reality TV where the norms of 
discourse are very different from those of traditional politics.20   
But presidents are neither the only, nor necessarily the 
most important of, government speakers. Governmental 
agencies, for example, are now major expressive players—a 
development initially inspired in large part by the urgencies of 
war and implemented by the federal Committee on Public 
Information, which relied on press releases, movies and 
newsreels, posters, traveling exhibits, speeches, books, and 
pamphlets to mobilize public support for the nation’s World 
War I efforts.21 The growth of the administrative state fueled 
the continued expansion of agencies’ expression. New Deal 
agencies’ speech, for example, celebrated the work of the 
Civilian Conservation Corps and explained the terms of the 
newly enacted Social Security insurance program.22 Federal, 
state, and local government agencies’ speech is now ubiquitous, 
with examples that include not only the Surgeon General’s 
report on the dangers of tobacco, but also the Forest Service’s 
                                                             
18 TULIS, supra note 6, at 4. 
19 Jill Colvin, Twitter Battle with Press May Come with a Price, AP NEWS (July 3, 2017) 
https://apnews.com/f3838ea7b4c645fb85b61303740cad86. 
20 See Daniel W. Drezner, Why is Donald Trump so Bad at the Bully Pulpit?, WASH. 
POST. (Aug. 14, 2017), 
http://wapo.st/2w4qic3?tid=ss_mail&utm_term=.2a1de22eb270.   
21 See WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION 46–47 (1922) (describing the Committee 
on Public Information as undertaking “the largest and most intensive effort to carry 
quickly a fairly uniform set of ideas to all the people of the nation”). 
22  JAMES C. MCCAMY, GOVERNMENT PUBLICITY 23, 39 (1939); see also id. at 227 
(“This expansion [in the administrative state] brought an attendant need for more 
explanation of the [government’s new] program and more attention to the possible 
public reaction to administrative practices. Likewise, as more of the public became 
involved in any way with the new program, more demands for information were 
created.”).   




Smokey Bear wildfire prevention campaign; health alerts from 
the Center for Disease Control; disaster preparedness warnings 
from emergency management offices; and many more. 
Legislatures also engage in a variety of expressive 
endeavors. Through resolutions, legislative bodies articulate 
their views on a particular topic. For instance, “in response to 
the outbreak of noose incidents in 2007, the entire United States 
federal legislature voiced its disapprobation. In December of 
that year, both the House and the Senate passed resolutions 
citing the history of lynching in America” and condemning the 
intimidating displays of nooses.23 Committee reports and 
related oversight activities also communicate the legislature’s 
priorities and values.24 As Josh Chafetz explains, “holding 
hearings and releasing information to the press and the public is 
an essential means by which houses and members make 
arguments in the public sphere and attempt to shape the public 
discourse.”25 
The judiciary speaks too. Not only does its power of the 
pen include the power to write opinions (including 
concurrences and dissents), but the judiciary also speaks in 
other settings to other governmental actors and to the public.26 
To be sure, the judiciary’s expressive norms vary from those of 
other government speakers in their greater tendency toward 
formality and deliberation; relatedly, judges (and government 
lawyers) are unlike other government speakers in that their 
speech is constrained by ethics codes that prohibit falsehoods,27 
ex parte communications,28 certain commentary on pending 
matters,29 and sometimes their campaign speech.30 Indeed, 
judges’ politically expressive efforts met with outcry and 
opposition very early on: recall that Supreme Court Justice and 
Federalist party member Samuel Chase faced impeachment 
proceedings for his expressive use of grand jury charges to 
                                                             
23 Charlotte H. Taylor, Hate Speech and Government Speech, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L., 
1115, 1146 (2010). 
24 See, e.g., Note, Blacklisting Through the Official Publication of Congressional Reports, 81 
YALE. L.J. 188 (1971) (discussing the expressive use of congressional reports to 
shame targeted individuals).  
25 JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE 
SEPARATION OF POWERS 152 (2017); see also id. at 38 (“[C]ongressional committees 
can drive the national agenda by holding hearings that draw attention to certain 
issues, and ‘entrepreneurial’ individual members of Congress, using the platform 
afforded by their offices (and, if necessary the protection afforded by the Speech or 
Debate Clause . . . ), can play key roles in shaping the national discussion.”). 
26 See generally RICHARD DAVIS, JUSTICES AND JOURNALISTS: THE U.S. SUPREME 
COURT AND THE MEDIA (2011). 
27 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011). 
28 Id. at r. 2.9. 
29 Id. at r. 2.10. 
30 Id. at r. 4.1. 
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attack the Republican party and its policies.31 Over time, 
however, some judicial speakers have shown increasing 
willingness to engage in public policy debates. Recall, for 
example, Chief Justice Charles Evan Hughes’ letter to the 
Senate Judiciary Committee refuting FDR’s claims that the 
nine-Justice Court was struggling to handle its workload—a 
letter many considered to be key in cohering opposition to the 
president’s Court-packing proposal.32 More recent illustrations 
include judges’ growing efforts to educate the public about the 
judiciary as an institution, and to engage debates about 
competing approaches to constitutional interpretation.33 Indeed, 
some judges now employ social media for these purposes.34  
In short, the history of government speech is as long as 
the history of governments; a history that reveals myriad 
changes and variations in the substance, tone, and delivery of 
the government’s chosen messages. In contrast, the Supreme 
Court’s government speech doctrine is relatively new. This 
doctrine permits the government to assert a privilege to control 
its own speech when defending Free Speech Clause challenges 
by private parties claiming a constitutional right to shut down 
the government’s expression. As the Court explained: 
 
When a government entity embarks on a course 
of action, it necessarily takes a particular 
viewpoint and rejects others. The Free Speech 
Clause does not require government to maintain 
viewpoint neutrality when its officers and 
employees speak about that venture. Here is a 
simple example. During the Second World War, 
                                                             
31 See Lynn H. Rambo, When Should the First Amendment Protect Judges From Their 
Unethical Speech? 5 (Tex. A&M Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 17–56, 2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3027761 (“Chase’s 
impeachment (and near conviction) seems to have persuaded the judiciary that its 
grand jury charges, and other judicial appearances, should no longer include overtly 
political speeches.”). 
32 See Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary: Hearings on S. 1392 Before the Senate Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 75th Cong. 488–92 (1937) (statement of Senator Burton K. Wheeler) 
(reading from Chief Justice Hughes’s letter: “An increase in the number of justices of 
the Supreme Court, apart from any question of policy, which I do not discuss, would 
not promote the efficiency of the Court. It is believed that it would impair that 
efficiency so long as the Court acts as a unit. There would be more judges to hear, 
more judges to confer, more judges to discuss, more judges to be convinced and to 
decide. The present number of justices is thought to be large enough so far as the 
prompt, adequate, and efficient conduct of the work of the Court is concerned.”). 
33 See DAVIS, supra note 26, at 184–85. 
34 See generally Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Twitter and the #So-Called Judge (S. Methodist 
Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 365, 2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3013241 (documenting some 
judges’ use of social media to respond to other speakers’ attacks on judicial 
legitimacy, to educate citizens about the legal system, and to address proposals for 
changes to the legal system).  




the Federal Government produced and 
distributed millions of posters to promote the war 
effort. There were posters urging enlistment, the 
purchase of war bonds, and the conservation of 
scarce resources. These posters expressed a 
viewpoint, but the First Amendment did not 
demand that the Government balance the 
message of these posters by producing and 
distributing posters encouraging Americans to 
refrain from engaging in these activities.35  
 
The government speech doctrine thus explains why tobacco 
companies do not have a First Amendment right to force the 
Surgeon General to deliver their views on the benefits of 
cigarettes, and why the Administration’s political critics do not 
have a First Amendment right to share the podium at the 
President’s State of the Union address. Instead, the First 
Amendment protects those dissenting speakers’ right to present 
their own views in their own reports and at their own press 
conferences. 
The Court’s government speech doctrine appropriately 
recognizes the value—and, indeed, the inevitability—of the 
government’s expressive choices.36 I believe, however, that its 
doctrine remains incomplete in at least two respects. First, the 
Court to date has failed to insist that the government 
affirmatively identify itself as the source of expression as a 
condition of claiming the government speech defense, even 
though meaningful political accountability requires such 
transparency.37 Second, the Court has yet to grapple with the 
ways in which the government’s speech sometimes 
affirmatively threatens specific constitutional values (apart from 
whether and when the government’s religious speech violates 
the Establishment Clause). By failing to address these issues, 
the Court has missed opportunities to check the government’s 
destructive expressive choices, including the government’s 
expressive efforts to manufacture doubt.  
To be sure, the government’s expressive choices are 
neither inevitably good nor bad. Through its speech, the 
government can educate, shame, empower, challenge, distress, 
comfort, or distract. While this Essay focuses primarily on a 
                                                             
35 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1757–58 (2017). 
36 See id. at 1758 (characterizing the Supreme Court’s government speech doctrine as 
“important—indeed, essential”). 
37 See Helen Norton, Government Speech and Political Courage, 68 STAN. L. REV. 
ONLINE 61, 66 (2015). 
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dark side of the government’s expression,38 the government’s 
speech can, and often does, serve important constitutional 
values. For example, presidents' expressive use of their bully 
pulpit to advocate for everything from tax reform to child 
nutrition can generate important public conversations and 
inform the public's political choices. Through its speech, the 
government can also assert moral and political leadership in the 
nation’s ongoing struggle to achieve equality. Recall, for 
example, President Lyndon Johnson’s nationally televised 
presidential exhortation that "We Shall Overcome" in the midst 
of the 1960s’ civil rights battles,39 President George W. Bush’s 
repudiation of anti-Muslim bigotry in a speech at a mosque 
immediately after the 9/11 attacks,40 and, more recently, New 
Orleans Mayor Mitch Landrieu’s explanation of his city’s 
expressive choice to remove its Confederate monuments from 
public property.41 
But the government’s speech sometimes excludes and 
divides in ways repugnant to equal protection values, as 
illustrated by the lies told by governmental officials to justify 
the World War II internment of thousands of Japanese-
American citizens.42 As another example, in the aftermath of 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 
many Southern governors and members of Congress, along 
with other state and local officials, engaged in an expressive 
campaign of “massive resistance” to undermine the Court’s 
credibility and legitimacy. 43 For instance, at his inauguration as 
                                                             
38 See Seth Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and 
Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 13 (1991) (“The landmarks by 
which we guide ourselves in constitutional law are usually not positive ideals but the 
dangers we have identified and seek to avoid.”). 
39 President Lyndon B. Johnson, “We Shall Overcome” Speech to Congress, (Mar. 
15, 1965) (transcript available at 
http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/centers/boisi/pdf/Symposia/Symposia%20
2011-2012/Johnson_WeShallOvercome.pdf).  
40 President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President at Islamic Center of 
Washington, D.C. (Sept. 17, 2001) (transcript available at https://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010917-11.html). For related 
examples, see Helen Norton, Government Speech and the War on Terror, 86 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 543, 545–46 (2017). 
41 See Katherine Sayers, Read Mayor Mitch Landrieu’s Speech on Removing New Orleans’s 
Confederate Monuments, NOLA (May 22, 2017, 2:18 PM), 
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2017/05/mayor_landrieu_speech_confede
r.html (“Surely we are far enough removed from this dark time to acknowledge that 
the cause of the Confederacy was wrong.”). 
42 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 235–40 (1942) (Murphy, J., 
dissenting) (describing the government’s many lies); Korematsu v. United States, 584 
F. Supp. 1406, 1418–22 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (describing evidence of the government’s 
lies in earlier proceedings). For additional examples, see Norton, supra note 40, at 
547–52. 
43 See BARTLEY, supra note 5, at 117 (describing the objective of the Southern 
manifesto as to “confuse legal and moral issues and to undermine any sense of 
inevitability a Supreme Court decision normally commands”).  




governor of Alabama, George Wallace climbed the state 
capitol’s steps to declare:  
 
Today I have stood, where once Jefferson Davis 
stood, and took an oath to my people. It is very 
appropriate then that from this Cradle of the 
Confederacy, this very Heart of the Great Anglo-
Saxon Southland, that today we sound the drum 
for freedom as have our generations of forebears 
before us done, time and time again through 
history. Let us rise to the call of freedom-loving 
blood that is in us and send our answer to the 
tyranny that clanks its chains upon the South. In 
the name of the greatest people that have ever 
trod this earth, I draw the line in the dust and 
toss the gauntlet before the feet of tyranny . . . 
and I say . . . segregation today . . . segregation 
tomorrow . . . segregation forever.44  
 
(As an example of governmental counterspeech, contrast 
Jimmy Carter’s inaugural address as Georgia’s governor just 
eight years later: “The time for racial discrimination is over.”45) 
The government’s expressive choices have undermined equality 
in other ways as well. At around the same time as the campaign 
for massive resistance, for example, a Senate subcommittee 
charged with investigating “The Employment of Homosexuals 
and Other Sex Perverts in Government” asserted that “[o]ne 
homosexual can pollute a Government office.”46 More recently, 
numerous state laws insist that public schools’ sex education 
curricula include anti-gay expression; Alabama, for example, 
requires “[a]n emphasis, in a factual manner and from a public 
                                                             
44 George Wallace, Former Governor of Alabama, Inaugural Address (1963) (Jan. 
14, 1963) (transcript available at 
https://web.utk.edu/~mfitzge1/docs/374/wallace_seg63.pdf). 
45 Jimmy Carter, Former Governor of Georgia, Inaugural Address (Jan. 12, 1971) 
(transcript available at 
https://web.archive.org/web/20161201224225/https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.go
v/documents/inaugural_address.pdf). 
46 S. REP. NO. 81–241, at 4 (1950); see also id. (“[I]t is generally believed that those 
who engage in overt acts of perversion lack the emotional stability of normal 
persons. In addition there is an abundance of evidence to sustain the conclusion that 
indulgence in acts of sex perversion weakens the moral fiber of an individual to a 
degree that he is not suitable for a position of responsibility. Most of the authorities 
agree and our investigation has shown that the presence of a sex pervert in a 
Government agency tends to have a corrosive influence upon his fellow employees. 
These perverts will frequently attempt to entice normal individuals to engage in 
perverted practices. . . .”). 
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health perspective, that homosexuality is not a lifestyle 
acceptable to the general public.”47  
The government’s speech can frustrate other 
constitutional values too. In the next Part, I draw from both 
historical and contemporary examples to identify ways in 
which the government’s expressive choices may manufacture 
doubt and distort the truth.  
 
II. THE GOVERNMENT’S CAPACITY TO MANUFACTURE DOUBT 
THROUGH ITS EXPRESSIVE CHOICES 
 
The government is unusually well-positioned to 
manufacture doubt through its expressive choices because it 
generally enjoys advantages of power and information over its 
listeners.48 Not only does the government exert coercive power 
over the public as sovereign, but it also speaks in a number of 
other roles in which it asserts power over its audience in various 
ways—for example, as employer, educator, property owner, 
and more. Indeed, the government sometimes holds its listeners 
“captive”—i.e., with limited possibilities for voice or exit49—as 
is the case of those in government custody, young people in 
public schools, and patients in certain public health care 
settings.50 The government’s often-privileged access to key 
information further empowers its ability to manufacture doubt 
about certain matters.51  
                                                             
47  ALA. CODE § 16-40A-2(c)(8) (1975); see also Clifford Rosky, Anti-Gay Curriculum 
Laws, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1463 (2017) (describing a variety of state laws regulating 
public school teaching and curricula).  
48 The government’s observers and critics have long objected to its efforts to exploit 
these advantages to “weaponize” its speech. See, e.g., News as a Weapon, CHI. DAILY 
TRIB., Nov. 2, 1962, at 16 (criticizing the Kennedy Administration’s “admitted effort 
to convert news of government into a propaganda weapon”). 
49 See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO 
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970) (explaining that individuals 
can change organizational behavior through voice (i.e., counterspeech objecting to 
the group’s behavior) or exit (i.e., demonstrating their unhappiness by leaving the 
group altogether). 
50 See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 699 (1970) 
(expressing concern about the government’s speech addressed to a captive audience 
and other “government expression that monopolizes or otherwise distorts the system 
of freedom of expression”).  
51 See LIPPMANN, supra note 21, at 247 (“The established leaders of any organization 
have great natural advantages. They are believed to have better sources of 
information. The books and papers are in their offices. They took part in the 
important conferences. They met the important people. They have responsibility. It 
is, therefore, easier for them to secure attention and to speak in a convincing tone. 
But also they have a very great deal of control over the access to the facts. Every 
official is in some degree a censor.”); David Pozen, The Rhetorical Presidency Meets the 
Drone Presidency (Columbia Pub. Law Research Paper No. 14–484, 2015), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= (“The Obama 
administration’s speeches are admirably low on demagoguery. Yet like all 
governmental presentations in public venues, they have a tendency to obscure or 




The government’s ability to manufacture doubt through 
its expressive choices is greater still because its identity and 
substantial resources enable it, relatively easily, to attract the 
attention of a large audience.52 Newer expressive technologies 
enhance these opportunities by empowering the government to 
reach its listeners immediately and without intermediation from 
the press or other skeptical third parties. During the Obama 
Administration, for example, the White House’s Office of 
Digital Services increasingly chose to break presidential news 
directly to the public through Obama’s social media accounts 
rather than wait for traditional print media to do so.53 That 
office also relied on analytics to “track what United States 
senators and the people who worked for them, and influenced 
them, were seeing online—and make sure that no potential 
negative comment passed without a tweet.”54 To be sure, the 
government’s reliance on such technologies can facilitate 
democratic accountability, free expression, and related 
constitutional interests by expanding public access to 
government information and enabling citizens’ participation in 
governmental processes.55 On the other hand, some expressive 
technologies can also mask the government’s authorship of, 
                                                                                                                                        
omit significant facts, complications, and objections, a tendency that is exacerbated 
in the national security field by the ready-made excuse of protecting classified 
information.”). 
52 See Jenna Johnson, This is What Happens When Donald Trump Attacks a Private 
Citizen on Twitter, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/this-is-what-happens-when-donald-
trump-attacks-a-private-citizen-on-twitter/2016/12/08/a1380ece-bd62-11e6-91ee-
1adddfe36cbe_story.html?utm_term=.54f42bcc1b13 (“With one tweet, Trump can 
change headlines on cable news, move financial markets or cause world leaders to 
worry. With one tweet last week, Trump inflamed a conflict with China. With 
another tweet on Tuesday, Trump caused Boeing stock to plummet. With a third on 
Wednesday night, Trump prompted a series of threatening calls to the home of a 
union leader who had called him a liar.”); see also Michael D. Shear, Trump as 
Cyberbully in Chief? Twitter Attack on Union Boss Draws Fire, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/08/us/politics/donald-trump-twitter-carrier-
chuck-jones.html (“David Axelrod, who was a senior adviser to President Obama, 
said he always advised the current occupant of the Oval Office to be mindful of the 
extra power that his words carried once they were amplified by the most powerful 
megaphone in the world. ‘What you may think is a light tap is a howitzer,’ Mr. 
Axelrod said. ‘When you have the man in the most powerful office, for whom there 
is no target too small, that is a chilling prospect. He has the ability to destroy people 
in 140 characters.’”). 
53 See Julie Hirschfeld Davis, A Digital Team Is Helping Obama Find His Voice Online, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/09/us/politics/a-
digital-team-is-helping-obama-find-his-voice-online.html. 
54 David Samuels, The Storyteller and the President, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 8, 2016, at 
MM44. 
55 See Davison v. Loudon Cty. Bd. Of Supervisors, 227 F. Supp. 3d 605, 609 (E.D. 
Va. 2017) (holding that the plaintiff had adequately alleged that a public official’s 
Facebook page was a limited public forum for First Amendment purposes). 
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and thus its political accountability for, various messages.56 
Moreover, the ever-increasing speed and reach of the 
government’s communication can exacerbate the harms of its 
hateful or deceitful speech.57 Indeed, changes in the means by 
which the government speaks can lead to changes in the 
substance of its speech as well. For example, Twitter requires 
brevity and rewards outrageousness; President Trump often 
excels at both.58   
The remainder of this Part explores three strategies 
through which government sometimes exploits these power and 
information advantages to manufacture doubt about factual 
assertions that it perceives to be inconsistent with its policy or 
partisan preferences: through its lies and misrepresentations, 
through its attacks on individuals and institutions that challenge 
its preferred narrative, and through its choices to bury or deny 
access to information that it finds inconvenient or dangerous. 
To be sure, this is not an exhaustive list, nor are these strategies 
mutually exclusive. 
 
A. Lies and Misrepresentations 
First, and perhaps most obviously, the government can 
manufacture doubt through its lies and factual 
misrepresentations.59 As I have detailed elsewhere, the 
                                                             
56 See Helen Norton & Danielle Keats Citron, Government Speech 2.0, 87 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 899 (2010) (describing the government’s transparent and opaque uses of newer 
expressive technologies). 
57 See YUDOF, supra note 4, at 11 (“The political significance of technology lies in the 
enhanced capacity of government officials to preserve their positions of power, to 
gain support for themselves and their policies, and to dominate discussion of public 
issues. Technology is ethically neutral, but unethical leaders seize upon it to advance 
their interests.”). 
58 See Richard L. Hasen, Cheap Speech and What It Has Done (to American Democracy), 
16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 200, 212 (2018) (“Trump is the first ‘Twitter president,’ 
not only in the volume of tweets that he sent out to his millions of followers but also 
in their incendiary nature. Trump was able to attract free (traditional) media 
attention through his social media program and communicate in ways that did not 
depend upon political parties, journalists, or other intermediaries to filter his 
message. And he was able to do so in short, angry bursts which would not be 
possible if directly addressing voters in a weekly radio address or a speech from the 
Oval Office. . . . Trump hurled insults and also used his Twitter account to spread 
false claims, for instance, that there was massive voter fraud in the 2016 election. He 
offered a variety of false, exaggerated, and incendiary claims many of which would 
not have been spread as widely and in an unmediated way before the era of cheap 
speech.”) (footnotes omitted). 
59 See David Leonhardt, Ian Prasad Philbrick, & Stuart A. Thompson, Trump’s Lies v. 
Obama’s, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/14/opinion/sunday/trump-lies-
obama-who-is-worse.html (“We applied the same conservative standard to Obama 
and Trump, counting only demonstrably and substantially false statements. The 
result: Trump is unlike any other modern president. He seems virtually indifferent to 
reality, often saying whatever helps him make the case he’s trying to make. . . . We 
have used the word ‘lies’ again here, as we did in our original piece. If anything, 
though, the word is unfair to Obama and Bush. When they became aware that they 




government’s lies can take many forms.60 For example, the 
government’s lies and misrepresentations include those that 
conceal itself as the source of a message to improve its 
reception in situations where the public might otherwise doubt 
the government's credibility.61 In terms of motive, the 
government’s lies include those to avoid political 
accountability, silence dissent, and manipulate public policy, as 
well as those that seek to create skepticism and cynicism and 
distrust more generally.62 The government can also 
manufacture doubt through falsehoods that seek to divert and 
distract the public from efforts to discover the truth. For 
example, in response to growing concerns about his campaign’s 
connections to Russia, President Trump claimed, without 
evidence, that President Obama had wiretapped him during the 
campaign;63 the Department of Justice later acknowledged that 
no such evidence existed.64  
 
B. Expressive Attacks on Critics and Dissenters 
Next, the government can manufacture doubt by seeking 
to silence or discredit those who speak about matters that 
threaten the government’s perceived self-interest.65 These tactics 
have a long pedigree. Queen Elizabeth forbade Parliament from 
discussing who might succeed her to the throne,66 for example, 
                                                                                                                                        
had been saying something untrue, they stopped doing it. . . . Trump is different. 
When he is caught lying, he will often try to discredit people telling the truth, be they 
judges, scientists, F.B.I. or C.I.A. officials, journalists or members of Congress.”). 
60 Helen Norton, The Government’s Lies and the Constitution, 91 IND. L.J. 73 (2015). 
61 See Helen Norton, Government Lies and the Press Clause, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2998909 
(offering examples of the government’s lies that conceal itself as the source of 
contested speech).  
62 This strategy is far from new. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 100 (1967) (“[A]n essential part in the 
pseudo-conservative world view is that our recent Presidents [FDR, Truman, and 
Eisenhower], being men of wholly evil intent, have conspired against the public 
good. This does more than discredit them: it calls into question the validity of the 
political system that keeps putting such men into office.”).  
63 See David Shepardson, Trump Claims Obama Wiretapped Him During Campaign; 
Obama Refutes It, REUTERS (Mar. 4, 2017, 8:05AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-obama/trump-claims-obama-
wiretapped-him-during-campaign-obama-refutes-it-idUSKBN16B0CC. 
64 See Deirde Walsh, Justice Department: No Evidence Trump Tower was Wiretapped, 
CNN (Sept. 3, 2017, 5:50PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/02/politics/justice-
department-trump-tower-wiretap/index.html; Nina Burleigh, Trump’s Claim that 
Obama Wiretapped His Campaign is False: U.S. Department of Justice, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 
2, 2017 12:49 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/trump-russia-investigation-wiretap-
fbi-obama-658888. 
65 See EMERSON, supra note 50, at 699 (expressing concern about “government 
expression used as a sanction against private expression”). 
66 See CHAFETZ, supra note 25, at 190, 245–46. 
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and the antebellum House of Representatives forbade the 
discussion of anti-slavery petitions on its floor.67  
More specifically, through its speech, the government 
can try to position itself as the authoritative source of 
information by attacking those who contest its preferred 
narrative.68 The government’s expressive attacks can be 
particularly effective when its targets are limited in their ability 
to engage in counterspeech—perhaps because they cannot 
attract the same media and public attention, or where they are 
politically or otherwise vulnerable.69 The government’s use of 
social media and related expressive technologies that encourage 
social and political polarization can additionally improve its 
ability to discredit and undermine those who challenge its 
preferred narrative.70  
The targets of the government’s expressive attacks can 
include institutions, like the press, the judiciary, or intelligence 
agencies. Indeed, the government’s lies are even more likely to 
succeed in deceiving the public if the government has already 
undercut truth-seeking institutions’ ability to offer counter-
narratives.71 The government’s expressive targets can include 
individuals: examples include the FBI's defamatory falsehoods 
about the government’s critics to friends, family members, 
                                                             
67 See WILLIAM LEE MILLER, ARGUING ABOUT SLAVERY: THE GREAT BATTLE IN THE 
UNITED STATES CONGRESS (1996). 
68 See David Nakamura, John Wagner, & Aaron Gregg, President Trump Locks Heads 
with News Media in a Social-Media First, WASH. POST (July 2, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/president-trump-locks-heads-with-news-
media-in-a-social-media-first/2017/07/02/313e1dd6-5f40-11e7-84a1-
a26b75ad39fe_story.html (“Presidential historians suggested that Trump’s social 
media attacks are lowering the bar on what constitutes appropriate presidential 
conduct in fighting perceived media enemies.”); see also id. (quoting Trump: “The 
fake media is trying to silence us, but we will not let them. The people know the 
truth.”). 
69 See Susan Collins, GOP Senator Susan Collins: Why I Cannot Support Trump, WASH. 
POST (August 8, 2016), http://wpo.st/MpAr1. Recounting candidate Trump’s verbal 
attacks on those who disagreed with him, including a reporter with disability, the 
Gold Star parents of Muslim soldier, and a federal judge engaged in ongoing 
litigation, Republican Senator Susan Collins concluded, “[I[t was his attacks directed 
at people who could not respond on an equal footing—either because they do not 
share his power or stature or because professional responsibility precluded them from 
engaging at such a level—that revealed Mr. Trump as unworthy of being our 
president.” Id. 
70 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC: DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL 
MEDIA 90 (2017) (“In the 2016 campaign for the presidency, Donald Trump showed 
a keen working knowledge of social influences and group polarization, constantly 
emphasizing how popular he was, and pointing constantly to the polls are 
evidence.”).  
71 See RonNell Andersen Jones & Lisa Grow Sun, Enemy Construction and the Press 
(Brigham Young Univ. Law Research Paper No. 17–23, 2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2929708 (explaining that the 
government sometimes engages in “enemy construction” in which it seeks to instill 
or exacerbate public fear of certain individuals, communities, or institutions—like 
the press, immigrants, or racial and religious minorities). 




employers, and the media during the 1950s and 1960s.72 The 
government’s targets can include organizations: as Justice Black 
explained during the Cold War era, “In the present climate of 
public opinion it appears certain that the Attorney General’s 
much publicized findings [that an organization should be 
designated to be ‘subversive’], regardless of their truth or falsity 
are the practical equivalents of confiscation and death sentences 
for any blacklisted organization not possessing extraordinary 
financial, political, religious prestige and influence.”73 The 
government’s targets can include its own employees: indeed, 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos74 empowered 
the government to punish public employees who report the 
government’s lies and other misconduct when it held that the 
First Amendment does not protect public employees' speech 
pursuant to their jobs.75  
Legislatures as well as executive branch speakers can 
manufacture doubt by attacking those who challenge the 
government’s “truth.”76 Senator McCarthy, among others, 
demonstrated how to capture media attention and partisan gain 
through outrageous and often unfounded charges.77 Seth 
                                                             
72 See GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES:  FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 490 (2004). 
The government sometimes urges private employers to punish governmental critics 
for their speech.  See David Nakamura, White House: ESPN’s Jemele Hill Should Be 
Fired for Calling Trump a ‘White Supremacist’, WASH. POST. (Sept. 13, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/09/13/white-
house-espns-jemele-hill-should-be-fired-for-calling-trump-a-white-
supremacist/?utm_term=.90e752b39a80 (quoting White House press secretary Sarah 
Huckabee Sanders as saying that a sportscaster’s Tweet describing Trump’s election 
as “the direct result of white supremacy” was “certainly something that I think is a 
fireable offense by ESPN”); Ken Belson and Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Attacks 
Warriors’ Curry. LeBron James’s Retort: ‘U Bum.’ N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2017), 
https://nyti.ms/2ykBBKX (quoting Trump as saying, “Wouldn’t you love to see 
one of those N.F.L. owners, when somebody disrespects our flag, to say, ‘Get that 
son of a bitch off the field right now, he’s fired.’”). 
73 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 142 (1951) (Black, 
J., concurring). 
74 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
75 Id. at 421. Lower courts have since applied Garcetti to reject the First Amendment 
claims of numerous government workers who truthfully sought to expose 
governmental misconduct. See Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: 
Government’s Efforts to Claim Its Workers Speech as Its Own, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 14–15 
(2009) (listing examples). 
76 See EMERSON, supra note 50, at 250–51 (“The resulting exposure, in which the 
witness is cast in the role of a disloyal or even traitorous citizen, multiplies the effect 
and extends it over an indefinite period of time. The witness may lose his job, even 
his career; he may suffer other forms of economic reprisal, such as inability to obtain 
insurance or a mortgage; he is subject to great social pressures, which operate also 
against his entire family . . . . [The committee] conducted hearings in a manner that 
tended to stimulate hysteria. It issued reports, with or without prior hearings, that 
condemned certain conduct as disloyal. It functioned, in short, as a sort of modern 
Inquisition, attempting to stamp out heresy in the nation.”). 
77 See JAMES RESTON, DEADLINE: A MEMOIR 220 (1991) (“Even with a superb staff, 
we were, I’m sorry to say, intimidated much of the time by the popularity of 
McCarthy’s lies and his charges that his opponents were ‘soft on communism.’”); see 
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Kreimer notes the power of the government’s speech in this 
regard:  
 
[T]he striking thing about the enterprise which 
Senator McCarthy embodied was that it 
achieved, strictly through the use of information, 
a substantial impact on citizens’ lives, the 
discourse of the republic, and the exercise of the 
First Amendment rights of speech, belief, and 
association . . . . The sanctions at the command 
of Senator McCarthy, and his precursors and 
imitators, were primarily the ability to obtain and 
publish information . . . . The legacy of the 
McCarthy era was illuminated by the potential 
for private suppression manifest in the civil rights 
struggles of the 1950s and 1960s. The two 
combined to fix in the judicial consciousness the 
destructive power of exposure as a sanction. 
Courts have realized that words lead to sticks and 
stones; both physical and social sanctions form 
legal reality.78 
 
The consequences of government speakers’ expressive 
attacks included targets’ job loss, property destruction, physical 
violence, and even loss of life. Many of these stories are well-
known, some less so. For example, shortly after Senators 
associated with McCarthy’s efforts threatened to disclose that 
Wyoming Senator Lester Hunt’s son had been arrested for 
soliciting a male police officer, Senator Hunt shot himself in his 
Capitol Hill office.79 And the day after the Attorney General 
announced in 1966 that he would seek to require the W.E.B. 
Dubois Club to register as a communist front organization, the 
club’s San Francisco office was bombed and its Brooklyn office 




                                                                                                                                        
also id. at 216 (“His charges may not have made sense, but they made headlines and 
they sold a lot of papers. McCarthy knew how to take advantage of this ‘cult of 
objectivity.’ He made the front pages by announcing his discovery one day and 
embellishing it a few days later, and each time he still hit the front pages.”).  
78 Kreimer, supra note 38, at 21, 28–29.   
79 See Drew Pearson, Washington Merry-Go-Round, MADERA DAILY NEWS-TRIB. 
(Cal.), June 23, 1954, at 9 (describing the incident as “one of the lowest types of 
political pressure this writer has seen in many years” and an example of “the new 
technique used by McCarthyites to pressure other senators”). 
80 See Ted Finman & Stewart Macauley, Freedom to Dissent: The Vietnam Protests and 
the Words of Public Officials, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 632, 633 (1966). 




C. Information Control 
The government can also manufacture doubt through its 
control of information. Here too its options are many and 
varied. A democratic government ideally makes expressive 
choices through which it shares information and encourages 
counterspeech.81 But the government sometimes instead 
manufactures doubt by depriving the public of access to key 
information.82 As Mark Yudof observed, “government 
expression and secrecy can sometimes” be the functional 
equivalent of censorship.83 Secrecy, in turn, breeds further 
doubt.84 
The government can control information not only 
through secret-keeping and selective disclosures,85 but also by 
abandoning efforts to collect or report factual information and 
by refusing to make its experts available for public discussion.86 
For instance, Robert Lopresti recounts that in 2004 the Bureau 
                                                             
81 See Jack M. Balkin, The First Amendment is an Information Policy, 41 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 1, 4 (2012) (“Authoritarian information states are information gluttons, 
information misers, and information monopolists. They try to collect as much 
information as they can, but they do not share it with their people. They try to 
monopolize control over information in order to serve the interests of those in power. 
Democratic information states, by contrast, are information gourmets, information 
philanthropists, and information decentralizers.”). 
82 See Heidi Kitrosser, Classified Information Leaks and Free Speech, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 
881, 885 (2008) (describing the dangers of certain government secrets). Mary Graham 
recounts that governmental norms of secrecy, like those of affirmative discourse, 
have also changed with time and leadership. For example, George Washington tried 
to champion a culture of openness, while Woodrow Wilson sought “new levels of 
government secrecy.” MARY GRAHAM, PRESIDENTS’ SECRETS: THE USE AND ABUSE 
OF HIDDEN POWER 48–49, 78–79 (2017).  
83 YUDOF, supra note 4, at 158. 
84 See Richard G. Powers, Introduction to DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, SECRECY: 
THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 19 (1998) (“McCarthyism would probably have been 
impossible except for the claim that official secrecy was keeping the American people 
from the truth about Communists.”); see also id. at 58 (“What secrecy grants in the 
short run — public support for government policies — in the long run it takes away, 
as official secrecy gives rise to fantasies that corrode belief in the possibilities of 
democratic government.”). 
85 For example, the government can leak information strategically and selectively in 
ways that support its preferred narrative. See generally David E. Pozen, The Leaky 
Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of 
Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512 (2013). My thanks to Joseph Blocher for 
suggesting this connection. 
86 See Juliet Eilperin & Brady Dennis, EPA Yanks Scientists’ Conference Presentation, 
Including on Climate Change, WASH. POST (Oct. 22, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/epa-yanks-scientists-
presentations-at-conference-on-narragansett-bay/2017/10/22/7429e65c-b76a-11e7-
a908-a3470754bbb9_story.html?utm_term=.9321d2d484df (reporting that the EPA 
“instructed two of its scientists and one contractor not to speak as planned at a 
scientific conference” on the climate change challenges affecting Narragansett Bay); 
but see Lisa Friedman, Scott Pruitt, E.P.A. Chief, Says Agency Scientists Are Free to Discuss 
Their Work, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/06/climate/scott-pruitt-epa.html (quoting EPA 
head Scott Pruitt as saying that “[p]rocedures have been put in place to prevent such 
an occurrence in the future”). 
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of Labor Statistics “became involved in a controversy related to 
what some interpreted as a deliberate attempt by George W. 
Bush’s administration to conceal information of which it 
disapproved. Specifically, the Bureau announced its plan to 
make major changes in the Current Employment Statistics 
(CES) survey” and to stop collecting separate data by sex in 
major industries.87 Lopresti characterizes these decisions as 
contributing to the government’s longstanding underestimation 
of women’s role in the American workforce.88 More recent 
illustrations include the Trump Administration’s decision to 
remove scientific information about climate change from 
federal agencies’ websites such that some estimate that it has 
cut available public data sets by 25 percent.89 Legislatures can 
similarly choose to deprive the public of information that might 
threaten a preferred factual narrative; for example, “[a]t the 
request of the National Rifle Association, Congress forbade the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention from gathering 
statistics on gun violence.”90 
The government can also hide, and thus dilute the 
power of, counterspeech by burying it in other government 
speech. For example, Julie Cohen describes “infoglut” as a way 
in which the government (and other speakers) can create 
confusion and undermine certainty by overloading the public 
with speech: 
 
The political and epistemological dilemmas of 
infoglut flow instead from abundance [rather 
than scarcity]. Techniques of critique and 
deconstruction increasingly become tools of the 
powerful, and sophisticated appeals to emotion 
and ingrained instinct readily overshadow 
reasoned argument. For example, “the rejoinder 
to critique is not the attempt to reassert a counter-
narrative about, say, the scientific consensus 
around global warning, but to cast doubt on any 
                                                             
87 ROBERT LOPRESTI, WHEN WOMEN DIDN’T COUNT: THE CHRONIC MISMEASURE 
AND MARGINALIZATION OF AMERICAN WOMEN IN FEDERAL STATISTICS 102 (2017). 
88 Id. at 252 (“This book contains multiple examples, over many decades, of 
government authors expressing astonishment that so many women were working for 
a living.”). 
89 See Juliet Eilperin, Under Trump, Inconvenient Data is Being Sidelined, WASH. POST 
(May 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/under-trump-
inconvenient-data-is-being-sidelined/2017/05/14/3ae22c28-3106-11e7-8674-
437ddb6e813e_story.html?utm_term=.56f9b71efcfa; see also Susan Nevelow Mart, 
Disappearing Government Information and the Internet's Public Domain, 36 ADMIN. & 
REG. L. NEWS 5, 7 (2011) (describing the government’s removal of information from 
public websites and the concerns that arise when we don’t know what was removed 
as well as what is no longer being reported).  
90 LOPRESTI, supra note 87, at 3–4.  




narrative’s attempt to claim dominance: all so-
called experts are biased, any account partial, all 
conclusions that result of an arbitrary and 
premature closure of the debate.” Information 
abundance also enables new types of power 
asymmetries that revolve around differential 
access to data and to the ability to capture, store, 
and process it on a massive scale.91  
 
Finally, the government can manufacture doubt by 
resisting oversight that might otherwise produce information 
that could challenge its preferred narrative—that is, by refusing 
to engage in dialogue with other government speakers.92 The 
government can achieve similar results by limiting access to the 
results of such oversight.93  
 
III. WHAT NEXT?  
 
   As the preceding Part explained, a variety of expressive 
strategies enable the government to manufacture doubt to 
protect its own interest at the expense of the public’s. This 
problem is a tough nut indeed, and I do not pretend to crack it 
here.94 Instead, I seek to invite additional thinking and 
discussion.  
                                                             
91 Julie E. Cohen, The Regulatory State in the Information Age, 17 THEORETICAL 
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92 See Burgess Everett & Josh Dawsey, White House Orders Agencies to Ignore Democrats’ 
Oversight Requests; Trump’s Aides are Trying to Shut Down the Release of Information that 
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http://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/02/federal-agencies-oversight-requests-
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Democratic congressional minorities from gaining new information that could be 
used to attack the president.”). 
93 See Mark Mazzetti & Matthew Rosenberg, Trump Administration Returns Copies of 
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to Congress copies of a 6,700-page Senate report from 2014 about the C.I.A. 
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Senate vaults indefinitely or even destroyed—and increases the risk that future 
government officials, unable to read the report, will never learn its lessons. . . . The 
central conclusion of the report is that the spy agency’s interrogation methods—
including waterboarding, sleep deprivation and other kinds of torture—were far more 
brutal and less effective than the C.I.A. described to policy makers, Congress and the 
public.”).   
94 See LIPPMANN, supra note 21, at 76 (“[T]he environment with which our public 
opinions deal is refracted in many ways, by censorship and privacy at the source, by 
physical and social barriers at the other end, by scanty attention, by the poverty of 
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violence, monotony. These limitations upon our access to that environment combine 
with the obscurity and complexity of the facts themselves to thwart clearness and 
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         To start, we might draw from Lawrence Lessig’s 
taxonomy of regulation and consider various responses that 
take the form of markets, architecture, law, and norms.95 A 
number of thoughtful commentators have started to discuss 
how market-based approaches might encourage social media 
platforms to address related challenges.96 And others have 
begun to suggest various architectural solutions, such as nudges 
to empower audiences’ ability to evaluate and counter 
expressive pathologies both public and private.97 
In terms of law, elsewhere I have discussed possible 
doctrinal responses to the problems of government speech. For 
example, we can understand government lies as a violation of 
the Free Speech Clause when they are sufficiently coercive of 
their targets’ beliefs or speech to constitute the functional 
equivalent of the government’s direct regulation of that 
expressive activity.98 Relatedly, the Court can adopt a more 
                                                                                                                                        
justice of perception, to substitute misleading fictions for workable ideas, and to 
deprive us of adequate checks upon those who consciously strive to mislead.”). 
95 See Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 662–64 
(1998) (describing how law, social norms, markets, and architecture all can regulate 
human behavior in different ways). In other words, we need to think about law, but 
not only about law. 
96 See, e.g., Lili Levi, Real “Fake News” and Fake “Fake News”, 16 FIRST AMEND. L. 
REV. 285-290 (2018) (recommending self-regulation by information intermediaries to 
discourage the dissemination of fake news and to require disclosure of the source of 
such communications); Mark Verstraete, Derek E. Bambauer, & Jane R. Bambauer, 
Identifying and Countering Fake News (Ariz. Legal Stud. Discussion Paper No. 17–15, 
2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3007971 (suggesting 
possibilities that include “creating new platforms that do not rely on online 
advertising” and “encouraging existing platforms to experiment with technical 
solutions to identify and flag fake news”).  
97 See Levi, supra note 96 (urging greater investment in listeners’ information literacy); 
see also JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED 
BY POLITICS AND RELIGION 79–80 (2013) (“The main way that we change our minds 
on moral issues is by interacting with other people. We are terrible at seeking 
evidence that challenges our own beliefs, but other people do us this favor, just as we 
are quite good at finding errors in other people’s beliefs. When discussions are 
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and the rider works frantically to rebut the opponent’s charges. But if there is 
affection, admiration, or a desire to please the other person, then the elephant leans 
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arguments.”); id. at 105 (“[E]ach individual reasoner is really good at one thing: 
finding evidence to support the position he or she already holds, usually for intuitive 
reasons. We should not expect individuals to produce good, open-minded, truth-
seeking reasoning, particularly when self-interest or reputational concerns are in 
play. But if you put individuals together in the right way, such that some individuals 
can use their reasoning powers to disconfirm the claims of others, and all individuals 
feel some common bond or shared fate that allows them to act civilly, you can create 
a group that ends up producing good reasoning as an emergent property of the social 
system.”). 
98 See Norton, supra note 60, at 100–07. Examples include the government’s lies to or 
about its critics intended to deter or otherwise retaliate against them for their speech 
(through, for example, false threats about legal consequences or lies that inflict 
reputational or economic injury), or the government’s lies to captive or otherwise 
vulnerable audiences intended to manipulate their expressive choices. Id. 




muscular Press Clause doctrine to empower the press to check 
the government’s destructive expressive choices.99 Moreover, to 
enable greater transparency and accountability, the Court 
should refine its government speech doctrine to require that the 
government identify itself as the source of a message as a 
condition of claiming the government speech defense to Free 
Speech Clause challenges.100 Legislatures can enact statutory 
responses to the government’s expressive manufacture of doubt 
requiring the government to make certain affirmative 
disclosures and to otherwise constrain its lies and 
misrepresentations, and enforcement officials can more 
vigorously enforce existing laws that prohibit government 
agencies from engaging in covert propaganda or that require the 
government to make certain information public.101  
           But as Thomas Emerson observed, “[T]he judicial 
structure is not capable, by itself, of fully protecting in practice 
the theoretical rights guaranteed under our system of freedom 
of expression. Full realization of those rights must depend 
ultimately upon attitudes ingrained in the public mind and 
support extended by the body politic as a whole.”102 This reality 
invites a turn to norms as an additional source of constraint on 
the government’s destructive expressive choices.  
Robert McAdams explains that “norms” refer “to 
informal social regularities that individuals feel obligated to 
follow because of an internalized sense of duty, because of a 
fear of external non-legal sanctions, or both.”103 Norms can 
effectively constrain behavior when those who violate them pay 
                                                             
99 See Levi, supra note 96 (urging that the Court revitalize press freedoms); Norton, 
supra note 61 (proposing that we “understand the Press Clause to protect certain 
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trust in the independence of the press and thus damage the effectiveness of its news-
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being the press—can similarly interfere with Press Clause functions by misleading 
the public about the source of press publications in ways that not only threaten to 
skew the public's decision-making, but also breach the public's trust in the press.”). 
100 See Norton, supra note 37. 
101 See Norton, supra note 40, at 560–61 (discussing possible statutory and 
enforcement responses); Norton, supra note 60, at 108–13 (discussing same); Norton, 
supra note 61 (discussing same). 
102 Thomas Emerson, Freedom of Expression in Wartime, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 975, 1007 
(1968); see also id. (“There is no effective legal remedy for much of [the government’s 
harassment of political dissenters through its own speech]. Statements of public 
officials or warnings of investigation, for instance, are not subject to judicial redress. 
Nor is it possible to obtain court review of most activities of legislative committees, 
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limitations of legal responses to the government’s constitutionally harmful speech). 
103 Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. 
L. REV. 338, 340 (1997). 
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a price for their choice. Counterspeech can thus shape norms 
through, for example, praise and criticism, and attendant 
reputational and political rewards and punishment.104 To these 
ends, governmental and nongovernmental actors’ 
counterspeech can enforce constructive norms of public 
discourse by challenging the government’s lies and 
misrepresentations, its expressive attacks on truth-seeking 
individuals and institutions, and other destructive expressive 
choices.105 Private and public counterspeakers’ tools for 
enforcing norms of governmental discourse include not only 
voice but also exit—i.e., their noisy withdrawal.106 
Note that law can sometimes support and embolden 
counterspeakers’ ability to enforce such norms.107 For example, 
Josh Chafetz explains how the protections of the Speech or 
Debate Clause at times enabled crucial disclosures by members 
of Congress in the face of executive branch secrecy and lies. As 
an illustration, Senator Mike Gravel read portions of the 
                                                             
104 See Cass R. Sunstein, Unleashed (Aug. 22, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) 
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U.S. society signal clearly their disapproval of the course the administration is 
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U.S. Muslims fear from Trump, WASH. POST. (Dec. 30, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/gen-kelly-has-talked-about-human-
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2c064d32a4bf_story.html?utm_term=.1cd0bfaa41d2 (“Dialogue and decency: In 
today’s hyper-polarized political climate, these are as rare as unicorns.”).  
106 See Powers, supra note 84, at 3 (describing Senator Moynihan’s resignation from 
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in response to then-CIA Director 
William Casey’s lies about the mining of Nicaraguan harbors during the Iran-Contra 
affair; Moynihan returned to the Committee when Casey apologized); Jena 
McGregor, Trump Fires Back After the CEO of Merck Resigned From His Manufacturing 
Council, WASH. POST (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-
leadership/wp/2017/08/14/trump-fires-back-after-the-ceo-of-merck-resigned-from-
his-manufacturing-council/ (quoting Merck CEO Kenneth C. Frazier’s resignation 
from Trump’s American Manufacturing Council “as a matter of personal 
conscience” because “America’s leaders must honor our fundamental values by 
clearly rejecting expressions of hatred, bigotry, and group supremacy”).  
107 See Richard A. Posner, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and Economic Analysis of Law: 
A Comment, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 553, 564 (1998) (“[N]orms and laws are substitutes 
and complements, and sometimes norms are sources or even targets of law. . . .”). 




Pentagon Papers on the Senate floor.108 More recently, Senators 
Wyden and Udall “announced on the Senate floor that the 
Obama administration had adopted a secret, implausible 
interpretation” of federal domestic surveillance law; this 
disclosure, in turn, led to further investigations and further 
disclosures by public and private actors alike.109 Indeed, 
federalism and separation of powers principles offer structural 
opportunities and incentives for counterspeech by some 
governmental actors.110  
Finally, the government’s own workforce is another 
precious source of counterspeech challenging governmental 
efforts to manufacture doubt.111 Sometimes this counterspeech 
takes the form of government workers’ public protests, 
sometimes their internal resistance, and sometimes their more 
innovative forms of counterspeech. For example, in response to 
the Trump Administration’s takedown of climate change data 
from government websites, some National Park Service 
employees created a new Twitter feed, @AltNatParkSer, to 
repost key information. 112  
As puny as these efforts to challenge the government’s 
manufacture of doubt may sometimes feel, the alternative—
doing nothing—is doomed to failure. McCarthy—to name a 
particularly notorious government speaker—defied the norms 
of governmental discourse of his time, yet lasted nearly six 
years, at least in part due to the acquiescence of governmental 
and nongovernmental actors alike.113 As Kathleen Hall 
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113 See RESTON, supra note 77, at 216–17 (“[M]ost news going to the papers and to the 
radio and television stations was comparatively free of analysis or even explanation. 
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political deception. For example, putting quotation marks around McCarthy’s false 
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[Eisenhower’s] technique of judicious leaving-alone was that McCarthy destroyed a 
lot of other people before Eisenhower finally had enough.”). Geof Stone recounts 
that “[d]uring a speech on the [Senate] floor, McCarthy piled hundreds of documents 
in front of himself, supposedly substantiating charges of Communist infiltration. He 
defiantly dared any senator to inspect them.” Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech in the 
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Jamieson recalls, “The demise of Joe McCarthy demonstrates 
that a sustained form of rebuttal is required to dispel an 
entrenched form of guilt by association.”114 In other words, we 
can find no substitute for persistent pushback, on all fronts, to 




The government’s expressive choices can serve, or 
instead threaten, deliberative democracy. At its best, the 
government’s voice speaks truth to power both public and 
private, and supports or amplifies the voices of the powerless. 
But government is not always at its best. Our history and 
continuing experience reveal a variety of ways in which the 
government's expressive choices can manufacture doubt, distort 
the truth, and frustrate key constitutional values. In this Essay, 
I’ve sought to identify some of these patterns, both 
longstanding and new, in hopes of helping to recognize and 
challenge their deployment. 
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